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TOO MUCH INFORMATION!:
THE NEED FOR STRONGER PRIVACY
PROTECTION FOR THE
ONLINE ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES AND
APPLICANTS
RALPH CARTER*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: You have recently applied for a highly
coveted position with a private employer. To make ends meet during the
current economic downturn, you have worked in a series of part-time jobs
that are decidedly outside of your desired career path. Luckily, you have
progressed quickly through several rounds of the interview process and a
battery of tests. The company's human resources manager has informed
you that the company would like to extend you an offer of employment,
subject to the results of the company's standard background investigation.
Imagine that as part of that company's background investigation, the
human resources manager has requested that you provide the passwords to
your personal Gmail account and your social network accounts on
Facebook, Myspace, Google+, and LinkedIn.1 You use those accounts
daily in your intimate personal interactions with family members, friends
and acquaintances. Your likely reaction would be one of shock at the
*J.D. 2014, St. John's University School of Law (Evening Division). Executive Notes and Comments
Editor for the Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development. Inaugural Winner of the Edwards,
Wildman, Palmer Prize for the Best Research Paper by a St. John's Law Student in the 2013-2014
Academic Year on a Fair Employment Law Subject. Carter was also a Ronald H. Brown Scholar and
received the Robert J. Nobile Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Law, the Junior Fellow
of the Center for Labor and Employment Law and the Dorothy Day Memorial Scholar for Excellence in
Labor and Employment Relations.
I Social networking sites may be defined as "web-based services that allow individuals to (1)
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made
by others within the system." danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008). Such sites "enable[]
individuals . . . to express themselves online by posting opinions, information, images, photos, music,
and links to other users." HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 59 (STANFORD UNIV. PRESS 2010).
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suggestion that such an utter intrusion into your personal life was a pre-
condition of employment with the company. You know, however, that if
you follow your initial inclination and respectfully decline the employer's
request for your personal account passwords, it is all but certain that your
application will be rejected. Given that there are no skeletons in your
personal online closet, you reason that there is really no harm in providing
your prospective employer with access to your protected personal accounts.
Therefore, discretion being the better part of valor, you acquiesce and
provide the human resource manager with your account passwords. After
all, you have been on the job market for the last year and your
unemployment compensation benefits and personal savings are rapidly
dissipating. You are also keenly aware that the longer you remain on the
job market, the less desirable you are as a candidate with other prospective
employers. 2
A week later when you inquire with the human resources manager, he
tells you that you are no longer under consideration for the position, but
declines to provide you with any details as to why. In racking your brain to
figure out what could have caused such a reversal of fortune, you recall that
some of your Facebook friends have posted on the private "wall" on your
Facebook page. In the posts, your friends expressed certain controversial
political views, and you lodged your support by "liking" the posts. Only
then does it occur to you that the company may have decided that your
political leanings are not in keeping with its corporate mission.
There have been a number of reported cases similar to the hypothetical
situation above in which employers have demanded access to password-
protected content on the personal social media network accounts of
employees and job applicants. In March 2012, the Associated Press
reported that a New York statistician applying for a consulting position
with a lobbying firm decided to withdraw his job application when the
prospective employer requested during the job interview that the applicant
provide his Facebook login.3 When asked in an ABC News interview why
he declined to provide his Facebook password, the statistician responded
that: "The most personal details of [his] life are contained on that social
network." 4 Numerous similar incidents have received media attention over
2 Tami Luhby, Only 1 in 10 Long-Term Unemployed Find Work, CNNMONEY (June 14, 2012,9:10
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/14/news/economy/long-term-unemployment/index.htm/.
3 Manuel Valdes, Job Seekers Getting Asked for Facebook Passwords, YAHOO! FINANCE (Mar. 20,
2012, 7:55 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/job-seekers-getting-asked-facebook-080920368.html.
4 Joanna Stem, Demanding Facebook Passwords May Break Law, Say Senators, ABC NEWS (Mar.
26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/facebook-passwords-employers-schools-demand-access-
facebook-senators/story?id=16005565#.T3yzMDy-68.
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the past several years. 5
By seeking to rummage through the password-protected social network
and other personal electronic accounts of applicants and employees,
employers risk taking a troubling step past the more commonly used
method of employing Internet searches to review publicly available online
information pertaining to employees and applicants. For instance,
according to a 2011 survey of more than 300 hiring professionals
conducted by social media monitoring service, Reppler, "more than 90% of
recruiters and hiring managers have visited a potential candidate's profile
on a social network as part of the screening process" and "69% of recruiters
have rejected a candidate based on content found on his or her social
networking profiles . . ."6 According to another survey, "two thirds of HR
managers will browse unprotected social media profiles of candidates." 7
The results of a 2010 survey commissioned by Microsoft show that "[o]f
the U.S. recruiters and HR professionals surveyed, 75% report that their
companies have formal policies in place that require hiring personnel to
research applicants online." 8 Notably, while the survey showed that 70% of
5 For example, in August 2009, a Georgia high school teacher was presented by her school
superintendent with the Hobson's choice of either resigning or facing suspension after an anonymous
email complaint about the teacher's purportedly inappropriate private Facebook postings. See LORI
ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO You ARE AND I SAW WHAT You DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH
OF PRIVACY 122-23 (FREE PRESS 2011). The offending posts amounted to a privately posted vacation
photograph of the teacher drinking a glass of Guinness while visiting a brewery in Ireland, and what
was arguably a mildly off-color private status update. Id In another example, in March 2010, a former
corrections officer with the Maryland's Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services was
required to provide his Facebook login and password as part of a recertification process after retuming
from a four-month leave of absence following his mother's death. The department instituted the practice
in order to screen its officers for gang affiliations. After the officer reported the incident to the
American Civil Liberties Union, the department amended its policy to make disclosures voluntary. Id.
at 123. In April 2011, a Michigan teacher's aide privately posted a photo on her Facebook page
depicting a co-worker's pants around her ankles, and a pair of shoes. Emil Protalinski, Teacher's Aide
Fired for Refusing to Hand Over Facebook Password, ZDNET (Apr. 1, 2012, 6:15 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/teachers-aide-fired-for-refusing-to-hand-over-facebook-
password/l 1246. A parent who was a Facebook friend of the educator reported her to the school district
superintendent, who repeatedly demanded access to the educator's Facebook page. When she refused to
provide access, the teacher's aide was suspended. Id.
6 Erica Swallow, How Recruiters Use Social Networks to Screen Candidates, MASHABLE (Oct. 23,
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/10/23/how-recruiters-use-social-networks-to-screen-candidates-
infographic/.
7 Francis Bea, What You Should Know About How Job Recruiters Use Social Media to Hunt You
Down, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/lifestyle/how-hr-uses-social-
media/#ixzz21ZtBWOq3. But see SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., SHRM SURVEY FINDINGS:
THE USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES & ONLINE SEARCH ENGINES IN SCREENING JOB
CANDIDATES (Aug. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/theuseofsocialnetworkingwebsitesandonlin
esearchenginesinscreeningjobcandidates.aspx ("Only 18% of organizations indicated using social
networking websites to screen job candidates during the hiring process; conversely, more than two-
thirds of organizations (71%) have never used these websites to screen job candidates or used them in
the past but no longer do so.").
8 CROSS-TAB, ONLINE REPUTATION IN A CONNECTED WORLD 8 (2010), available at
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U.S. recruiters had rejected candidates on the basis of online information,
only 7% of U.S. consumers believed that their online information was used
in making hiring determinations.9 However, a more recent survey of social
media users between the ages of 18 and 34 revealed that 29% of
respondents feared adverse employment repercussions could result from
their public postings on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, Pinterest, and Tumblr; 21% of those surveyed reported that they
had removed potentially damning content from their social media accounts
in order to avoid such a consequence.o
Because the information accessed by employers under such
circumstances is, by its nature, publicly available, there is not the same
level of concern that individuals' privacy has been invaded by these
inquiries. By contrast, employers that seek unfettered access into the
private online communications of current and prospective employees do a
grave disservice to these individuals' privacy rights. In each of these
reported incidents, 11 the employees and applicants availed themselves of
the privacy settings on their social networking accounts. In doing so, the
individuals indicated that the matters discussed within that sphere were
considered private. This is so without regard to the number of individuals
with whom that employee or applicant saw fit to share her content online.
"In sum, the fact that 'an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean that
an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information."' 12
When employers delve improperly into individuals' private online
accounts, there is also the looming specter that the information gleaned as a
http://go.microsoft.com/?linkid-97095 10.
9 Id.
10 Betty Wang, 29% Fear Social Media Will Get Them Fired: Survey, LAW & DAILY LIFE: THE
FINDLAw LIFE, FAMILY & WORKPLACE LAW BLOG, (July 30, 2013, 7:38 AM),
http://blogs.fmdlaw.com/law andlife/2013/07/29-fear-social-media-will-get-them-
fired.html?DCMP=NWL-conshumanresource.
11 See supra note 5.
12 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-
64, 770 (1989) (quoted in Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory ofPrivacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REv.
919, 923 (2005)). It may be conceded that particularly motivated employers in certain cases may be
able to obtain access to a subject employee's or applicant's private information by identifying "friends"
with open social network profiles in order to obtain access to password-protected information the
subject employee has shared with those "friends." See Francis Bea, What You Should Know About How
Job Recruiters Use Social Media to Hunt You Down, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 27, 2012),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/lifestyle/how-hr-uses-social-media/#ixzz2lZtBWOq3. However, this sort
of unintended access is akin to a situation in which one makes an ill-advised disclosure in confidence to
one who should not have been entrusted with the information. That there may be a means to acquire
private information in certain cases by circumvention of the employee or applicant's privacy settings
does not negate the notion that protections should be implemented to prevent employers from
compelling individuals to divulge this information as a condition of employment.
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result may be used to take illegal employment actions on the basis of
current or prospective employees' protected class status, such as race,
ethnicity, marital status, age, sexual orientation, pregnancy, religion, or
disability.13 There is an infinite array of personal interests, proclivities, and
characteristics that may be ascertained by an employer by viewing a job
candidate or employee's social media profile - public or private depending
on the individual user's security settings. Much of that information likely
has limited value in assessing a particular employee or candidate's
suitability for a particular job. The information thus acquired by a
prospective or current employer may be said in some instances to provide a
richer picture of an individual and aid in the employer's determination as to
whether a particular employee or candidate is a proper "fit" for the
organization. However, such social network information may also
introduce subjective criteria and reinforce subtle biases based on
information that may have little to no utility in assessing a particular
employee or candidate's suitability for a job.14 Permitting employers to
riffle through the password-protected segments of candidates' and
employees' social network accounts would seem only to increase the
likelihood that employment decisions taken based on such information
13 Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social
Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 462-63 (2008) (observing
that while such "characteristics as race, sex, color, and perhaps age, would become evident to an
employer during an interview ... the employer would not likely know those factors during the earlier
stages of the application process" and "[ilnformation regarding marital status, sexual orientation, and
political affiliation would not be known unless volunteered by the applicant or directly asked about by
the employer."). It bears noting that marital status, sexual orientation and political affiliation are not
protected characteristics under federal antidiscrimination statutes as to private-sector employers.
Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 235
(2012) ("[U]nder current judicial interpretations none of the federal discrimination laws governing
discrimination in private employment prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.");
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Title VII Protection, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... does not include marital
status as one of its protected categories."); see, e.g., Del Pilar Salgado v. Abbott Labs., 520 F. Supp. 2d
279, 290 (D.P.R. 2007) (observing that "political affiliation discrimination claims are not cognizable
under Title VII"). Rather, at present, discrimination by a private employer on the basis of marital status,
sexual orientation or political affiliation might only be covered by federal law to the extent that the
conduct at issue might be deemed to be based on a protected classification such as gender or race.
Schwartz, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 236-37 & n.208 (collecting cases); Porter, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
1, 8-9. Certain states and municipalities may provide additional explicit protection against
discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation or political affiliation. See Schwartz, 35
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 235 & n.199; Porter, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 5; 4-129 Labor and
Employment Law § 129.08 (MB 2013) ("The civil rights acts of some states include political
discrimination among the forbidden kinds of employment discrimination.").
14 See Megan Whitehill, Better Safe Than Subjective: The Problematic Intersection of Prehire
Social Networking Checks and Title VII Employment Discrimination, 85 TEMPLE L. REv. 229, 259
(2012) (observing that "employers that engage in social networking checks state that largely subjective
criteria govern their evaluation of an applicant's social networking profile, such as the applicant's "fit"
within the organization and the applicant's creative abilities").
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would be infected by implicit bias and other improper criteria. 15
By accessing employees' and applicants' private online information,
employers may also increase their exposure to potential liability for
negligent retention and hiring claims. That is because once the private
online content is accessible to the employer, it may be inferred that it
would be negligent for a current or prospective employer to have failed to
review and take appropriate action based on such information.16
Consequently, the net effect of restricting the employer's access to private
online content would be to protect employers from themselves.
To counter the spate of employers' intrusions into private virtual
domains of job applicants and employees, federal legislation was
introduced in the 112th Congress that would bar employers from requiring
employees or job applicants to provide user login or passwords to their
social media and email accounts as a condition of employment. On April
27, 2012, Representatives Eliot Engel and Janice Schakowsky introduced
the Social Networking Online Protection Act [referred to hereinafter as
"SNOPA"] in the U.S. House of Representatives. 17 On May 9, 2012,
Senators Richard Blumenthal, Chuck Schumer, Ron Wyden, Jeanne
Shaheen, and Amy Klobuchar introduced the Password Protection Act of
2012 [referred to hereinafter as "PPA"] in the U.S. Senate.1 8 These recent
legislative efforts have been prompted in part by what has been
characterized by some commentators as the inadequate or uncertain
protections afforded by existing federal law.1 9 Neither of the federal bills
15 Cf id. at 258 ("The social networking check allows the actor's implicit bias to unwittingly affect
the earliest stage of the hiring process. . . .").
16 Katherine A. Peebles, Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can
Save Employers From Inevitable Liability, 53 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1416 (2012) ("noting that
"some commentators and attorneys have warned hiring officials that failing to screen potential
employees via the Internet may expose them to negligent hiring liability"). See id. ("Because running a
Google search is even simpler than conducting a traditional background investigation, courts will
almost certainly rule that employers should have known about any Internet-based information that
speaks to an applicant's dangerous proclivities.").
17 H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. (2012).
18 S. 3074, 112th Cong. (2012).
19 On March 25, 2012, Senators Blumenthal and Schumer, co-sponsors of the PPA, wrote letters to
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Jacqueline A. Berrien, the Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asking that they investigate whether "requiring job applicants to
provide their usernames and passwords to social networking sites like Facebook as part of the hiring
process" might violate existing federal law. Press Release, Blumenthal & Schumer, Employer Demands
For Facebook And Email Passwords As Precondition For Job Interviews May Be A Violation Of
Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds To Investigate (Mar. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-schumer-employer-demands-
for-facebook-and-email-passwords-as-precondition-for-job-interviews-may-be-a-violation-of-federal-
law-senators-ask-feds-to-investigate. In their letter to Attorney General Holder, the senators asked
whether such practices might violate the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., or the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. In their letter to EEOC Chair Berrien, the
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progressed past the committee stage in the 112th Congress. On February 6,
2013 and August 1, 2013, respectively, SNOPA and PPA were
reintroduced in the 113th Congress.20
Several states have also enacted or proposed legislation intended to
protect job applicants' and employees' private online information.2 1 In
May 2012, Maryland became the first state to enact a password-protection
statute. 22 Since that time, another ten states have enacted password-
protection statutes, and provisions are under consideration in some twenty
other states. 23
The state statutes vary widely as to their scope in a number of key areas
including: (1) what conduct is proscribed; (2) whether only social media
accounts are protected, or other online accounts such as electronic mail, are
also covered; (3) whether employees and applicants are afforded a private
right of action; (4) what remedies are available; and (5) whether there are
statutory exceptions for instances in which employers seek access to
password-protected personal information in furtherance of legitimate
business purposes, such as workplace harassment investigations or
compliance with legal or regulatory requirements. 24 The relentless
profusion of varying state provisions is an expanding mosaic of uncertainty
for employers, employees and applicants. 25
This Note posits that a comprehensive federal statute is needed to
provide employees and applicants with the means to protect their private
online information from unwarranted scrutiny by employers. The Note's
model federal statute, the Personal Electronic Account Privacy Protection
senators observed that the practice could provide employers with "access to private, protected
information that may be impermissible to consider when making hiring decisions," such as "personal
communications, religious views, national origin, family history, gender, marital status, and age." Id.
20 H.R. 573, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1426, 113th Cong. (2013).
21 National Conference of States Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and
Passwords, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-
2013.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
22 User Name and Password Privacy and Protection Act, 2012 Md. Code. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv.
233 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at Md. Code. Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-712 (LexisNexis 2008 &
2011 Supp.)).
23 Phillip Gordon & Joon Hwang, Making Sense of the Complex Patchwork Created by Nearly One
Dozen New Social Media Password Protection Laws, JD SUPRA LAW NEWS (July 2, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/making-sense-of-the-complex-patchwork-cr-71852/.
24 Id.
25 At least one commentator has proposed federal preemption as a means to address the
hodgepodge of state laws. See id. (arguing that "the only cure for the tangle of state law restrictions on
access to social media content would be a federal law that preempts all of the state laws"). This Note
suggests that rather than pursuing such a draconian intrusion on state police power, a more measured
approach is warranted - i.e., a federal law that contains an election-of-remedies provision such that
resort to the federal law would relinquish a state law claim for the same underlying conduct. See infra
pp. 9 & note 27.
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Act [referred to hereinafter as the "PEAPPA"],26 would protect employee
and applicant private online information by setting a nationwide standard
that is certain and manageable.
In particular, the PEAPPA would explicitly provide for the following:
* Private right of action for employees and applicants against
employers for violations of the Act;
* Private right of action for employees and applicants against
providers of social network sites and other online service providers
who fail to provide users a minimum thirty days' advance written
notice and an opportunity to opt out of the subject service prior to
making changes to privacy policies, terms of service, or taking other
actions which have the effect of disclosing users' private account
information;
* Private right of action for dissemination of private information by
employer, except where necessary to comply with law or to report a
good-faith belief that the employee or applicant has violated a
federal, state or local law or ordinance;
* Compensatory, statutory and punitive damages;
* Injunctive and declaratory relief;
* Exceptions for certain legitimate employer inquiries, and compliance
with legal and regulatory requirements;
* Election-of-remedies provision such that the commencement of an
action under PEAPPA would constitute a waiver of the rights and
remedies available to an applicant or employee under any other
Federal or State law, rule or regulation, or the common law based on
the same conduct, while preserving statutory and common-law
claims distinct from the PEAPPA claim. 27
26 See infra pp. 29-32.
27 Cf Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-8 (West 2013) (quoted in
Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 238 (App. Div. 1994)) (affirming dismissal of common-
law claims related to same conduct as whistleblower claim, and reversing with respect to those
"collateral issues [that] do not resemble the alleged [whistleblower] violations and require different
proofs than those needed to substantiate the [whistleblower] claim"), affd, 141 N.J. 16 (1995).
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Part II of this Note details the challenges presented by the existing
federal framework by the use of the Stored Communications Act28
[hereinafter, the "SCA"] and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act29
[hereinafter, the "CFAA"] in the protection of employees' and applicants'
personal online social media and email accounts from scrutiny by
employers. Part III of this Note addresses the limited efficacy of the
common-law tort for invasion of privacy as a means to protect individuals'
private social media and email account information from unwarranted
intrusion by their employers. Part IV of this Note outlines the approach of
the model statute, the PEAPPA, and demonstrates how its salient
provisions would address significant shortcomings in the federal proposals
and myriad state statutes.
II. EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Stored Communications Act
In several cases involving allegations of inappropriate access to
employees' online account information, parties have resorted to the SCA to
seek redress.30 "The SCA makes it an offense to 'intentionally access[]
without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided ... and thereby obtain[] ... access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system." 31 Because the SCA was enacted in 1986, it has been noted that
"[c]ourts have struggled to analyze problems involving modem technology
within the confines of this statutory framework, often with unsatisfactory
results." 32 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., for example, the court
28 18 U.S.C. § 2701 etseq. (2006).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. (2006).
30 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (company violated SCA by
improperly accessing employee's password-protected restricted access website using co-worker's
credentials); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88702, at *9
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (declining to overturn jury award in plaintiffs' favor under SCA where it was
reasonable for jury to infer that company supervisor coerced plaintiffs' co-worker into accessing
password-protected Myspacechat room in her presence); Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that company employees
violated SCA by accessing co-worker's personal Hotmail account to establish that he intended to start a
competing business; the employees accessed the co-worker's personal email by using his password that
had been saved on his company computer). See also Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d
965 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that private Facebook and Myspaceposts are covered by the SCA).
31 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (cited in Konop, 302 F.3d at 879).
32 Konop, 302 F.3d at 874.
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noted that "the difficulty is compounded by the fact that the [SCA] was
written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web [and]
[a]s a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address
modem forms of communication." 33
1. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group
In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, plaintiffs alleged that their
employer violated the SCA when a restaurant manager accessed a secure
password-protected Myspacechat room, Spec-Tator, which was used by
plaintiffs and their co-workers as a forum for employees to complain about
the employer. 34 The manager instructed one of the plaintiffs' co-workers to
access the site so that the manager could read the chat room posts. Based
on the company's determination that the Spec-Tator posts were offensive
and violated company policy, the company fired the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs brought suit in New Jersey federal court asserting statutory
and common-law claims. After dismissal of certain claims by pretrial
motions and stipulation, the parties proceeded to trial on the remaining
claims for violation of the SCA and the analogous New Jersey statute,
common-law invasion of privacy and wrongful termination in violation of
public policy. 35 After a jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their SCA and
New Jersey statutory claims, the defendant moved for a new trial on the
basis that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to establish that
the manager's access to Spec-Tator was without authorization because she
was allowed to view the chat room by an authorized user. 36 The trial court
denied the motion, holding that "the jury could reasonably infer ... that
[the co-worker's] purported 'authorization' was coerced or provided under
pressure." 37 Consequently, the trial court upheld the jury's finding against
defendants on the SCA claim.
Although the Pietrylo court found in plaintiffs' favor on their SCA
claim, it is noteworthy that the issue of liability turned on the fact-specific
question of whether defendants were authorized to access the password-
protected Myspacechat room. Given the asymmetry of bargaining power in
the typical employer-employee relationship-which is even more so in the
33 717 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (quoting Konop, 302 F.3d 868 at 874).
34 No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88702 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009); No. 06-5754 (FSH),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
35 Id
36 Id. The jury found in defendants' favor on the common-law invasion of privacy claim and as a
result, the parties agreed that the jury did not need to deliberate on the plaintiffs' claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. Id. ni.
37 Id.
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case between prospective employer and applicant-it is not clear that an
employee's authorization to access private online information could be
deemed freely given. Rather, when an employer requests or demands
access to an applicant's or employee's private online information, the
inherent inequality in the relationship renders such consent of dubious
weight.
As discussed in Part IV infra, the provisions of the PEAPPA model
statute would protect employees and applicants by setting a definitive
bright line, making clear that requiring or requesting an employee or
applicant to provide access to his or a co-worker's private online
information is impermissible unless an enumerated exception applies. 38
2. Increasing Uncertainty As to Applicability of SCA to Online
Account Information
Notwithstanding that some courts have found the SCA to apply in cases
involving unauthorized access to employees' personal online accounts,39
there is growing uncertainty among the courts as to whether the statute
applies in such circumstances. The SCA prohibits "intentionally accessing
without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided," and thereby obtaining access to an "electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage."40
The question of whether a particular electronic communication is in
"electronic storage" for purposes of the SCA is one that is unsettled by the
courts.4 1 In the email context, the question of whether a communication is
in electronic storage can turn on whether an email in the intended
recipient's in-box has been read or not.42 This conundrum is due in part to
the fact that "[w]hen the SCA was enacted in 1986, computers were
expensive and primarily used for storing and processing information" and
that "E-mail providers only maintained a user's information temporarily in
'electronic storage' before the information was delivered to the
recipient." 43
38 See PEAPPA § 3, infra pp. 29-30.
39 See supra note 30.
40 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (quoted in Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Ind. 2011)
(emphasis added).
41 See Rene, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96 (collecting cases).
42 Id. ("It is unclear whether opened email messages are in electronic storage.") (collecting cases).
In Rene, the court declined to reach the issue of whether the email communications in question were in
electronic storage, holding that although the plaintiffs complaint did not state "whether the email
messages accessed by the Defendants had already been opened by her, [plaintiff] Rene [was] not
required to allege such details at [the motion to dismiss] stage. Id. at 1097.
43 Lindsay S. Feuer, Who Is Poking Around Your Facebook Profile?: The Need to Reform the
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Adding to the uncertainty as to the reach of the SCA, in October 2012,
the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision in Jennings v.
Jennings,44 a case involving allegations that plaintiffs Yahoo! email
account was hacked by his daughter-in-law, who guessed his security
questions in order to access incriminating emails between the plaintiff and
his mistress.45 The daughter-in-law allegedly provided copies of plaintiff's
emails to his estranged wife's divorce attorney and private investigator.46
The plaintiff-husband filed suit, alleging that his daughter-in-law's
unauthorized access to his Yahoo! email account violated the SCA.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the plaintiff-husband's
emails on the Yahoo! server were not in "electronic storage" because they
were not "stored for 'purposes of backup protection."' 47 In effect, the
majority reasoned that for the emails in plaintiffs Yahoo! account to be
considered backups, plaintiff would have had to keep copies of those
messages elsewhere. Consequently, the court held that the intentional
hacking into plaintiff s email account did not violate the SCA.48
Whether a private Facebook wall posting or other electronic
communication sent to an employee's social networking account would fall
within the purview of the SCA under the narrow definition of "electronic
storage" enunciated in Jennings is uncertain at best. Following the
rationale of Jennings, a court could hold that communications saved within
a social networking site such as Facebook are not in electronic storage
under the SCA unless a user saves another copy of the communications
elsewhere.
For instance, applying Jennings' holding to the facts in Pietrylo, an
argument could be made that communications in the Spec-Tator
Myspacechat room were not backups unless the messages were
Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy on Social Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 473, 496 (2011).
44 736 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
45 Id. at 243.
46 Id.
47 Id at 245 ("We decline to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes storing it for backup
protection under the [SCA]."). In ruling that the ordinary meaning of the term "backup" required the
existence of another copy of the emails in question, to which the copies on the Yahoo! server would
serve as a "substitute or support," the Jennings court explicitly rejected the reasoning of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir.
2004), which held that "e-mails which had been received and read, and then left on the server instead of
being deleted, could be characterized as being stored 'for purposes of backup protection' and therefore
kept in electronic storage under subsection (B)." 736 S.E.2d at 244-45.
48 Id. In a concurring opinion, the court observed that "[m]uch of the difficulty in applying the
SCA to cases such as this arises because of the discrepancy between the current technology and the
technology available in 1986 when the SCA was first enacted" and that "[t]he SCA is ill-fitted to
address many modem day issues. . ." Id. at 248 (Beatty, J., concurring).
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downloaded by plaintiffs, so could not be deemed in electronic storage for
purposes of the SCA. As a result, the Pietrylo plaintiffs' SCA claim would
likely not have made it to the jury.49
In light of the challenges in applying the SCA to modem technologies,
and also the limitations of its reach to instances in which access is
unauthorized, there is a need for a statutory scheme in the form of the
model statute proposed in Part IV that would provide certain and specific
protections to employees' and applicants' private online communications
from improper access by employers. In addition, the expansive language of
the PEAPPA would avoid constricted interpretations of covered
technologies that would unduly limit its intended coverage. 50
B. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Under the CFAA, a 1986 anti-hacking statute with criminal and civil
provisions, a civil plaintiff may recover upon a showing that the defendant
"intentionally access[ed] a computer without authorization or exceed[ed]
authorized access, and thereby obtain[ed] ... information from any
protected computer; [or] . . . "intentionally access[ed] a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, cause[d] damage and
loss."5 Under the CFAA's broad definition, a "protected computer"
includes a computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce. 52
Consequently, the CFAA's broad scope has been held to cover the
computers of the social networking site Myspace. 53
49 By contrast, in Crispin, the court held that the Facebook wall posts and Myspacecomments were
protected under the SCA. 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989 ("Given the court's conclusion that the BBS
communication in Konop could not have been in temporary, intermediate storage, it appears that the
passive action of failing to delete a BBS post, which is in all material ways analogous to a Facebook
wall posting or a Myspacecomment, also results in that post being stored for backup purposes."). The
court reasoned by analogy based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Konop that, "[b]ecause Facebook
wall postings and Myspacecomments, on the one hand, and bulletin postings on a website such as
Konop's, on the other, cannot be considered to be in temporary, intermediate storage, the court
interprets Konop as holding that the postings, once made, are stored for backup purposes." Id.
50 See PEAPPA § 2(c), infra p. 29 (defining a "personal electronic account" as "an electronic
service, account, or electronic content created via a bounded system, that requires the employee or
applicant for employment to input or store access information via an electronic device to view, create,
utilize, or edit the employee or applicant's account information, including, but not limited to, videos,
still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or
accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations, profile, display, communications, or other stored
data").
51 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) & (a)(5)(C) (quoted in Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 WL
6739448 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011)).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2006).
53 See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the "protected
computer" requirement was met in criminal case involving improper use of Myspace in excess of its
terms of use; the requirement "is satisfied whenever a person using a computer contacts an Internet
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However, there are several obstacles to the use of the statute to protect
employee and applicant private online information. The CFAA requires an
employee to show that an employer accessed the employee's information
intentionally and without authorization. As with the SCA, this requirement
would likely be subject to repeated challenge in the employment context, as
employers could be expected to counter CFAA claims by claiming that
they were authorized by the employee or applicant to access their private
online accounts, notwithstanding that the unequal bargaining position
between the parties in most cases would tend to negate any claim that such
access authorization could be freely given.
An additional challenge exists in the context of a CFAA civil action
alleging unauthorized access to an employee's social media or email
account. To maintain a private action under the CFAA, a party must also
satisfy the "requirements of § 1030(g), which provides in relevant part
[that] [a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of
this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." 54
The requirement that a party demonstrates loss or economic damage
under the CFAA is a significant hurdle to recovery in connection with
cases involving unauthorized access to employees' password-protected
social networking account information. As to loss under the CFAA, courts
generally require that "the alleged 'loss' must be related to the impairment
or damage to a computer or computer system." 55 It would be the rare case
in which an employer's unauthorized access to an employer or applicant's
online account could be shown to cause actual damage to an employee or
applicant's computer. Rather, the nature of the injury in such cases in
terms of violation of personal privacy is generally of a more inchoate
nature.
As a result, a CFAA claim involving unauthorized or exceeded access to
an employee or applicant's private online account information would likely
lie only under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(i)(I), for which claims damages "are
limited to economic damages." 56 The economic damages requirement of
website and reads any response from that site").
54 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147247 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011).
55 Id. at *8 (internal citation omitted).
56 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006). The remaining clauses of the subsection provide for a civil action in
the following instances, none of which would be present for unauthorized access to a user's social
network account: "(11) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the
medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (111) physical injury to any
person; (IV) a threat to public health or safety; [or] (V) damage affecting a computer used by or for an
entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense,
or national security." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
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the CFAA limits the ability of employees and applicants to seek recovery
for violations of their privacy rights resulting from employers' intrusions
into their private online accounts.
1. Eagle v. Morgan
The CFAA's economic damages requirement proved fatal in a case
involving allegations of improper access to a former employee's social
networking account. In Eagle, a former executive with Edcomm, an
education banking company, brought suit under the CFAA alleging that her
former employer improperly accessed her LinkedIn account without
authorization and changed her password after terminating her
employment. 57 The company encouraged plaintiff to use her LinkedIn
account as a marketing tool for the company. One of Edcomm's
employees assisted the plaintiff in maintaining her LinkedIn account and
had access to her account password. When the company terminated
plaintiffs employment, Edcomm changed the password of the plaintiffs
LinkedIn account, thereby disabling her access. It also reset the profile to
reflect the name and photograph of the company's new interim CEO.
Plaintiff alleged that as a result of these improper actions, her "business
contacts or potential customers of [plaintiff s], who were searching for her
profile, [were] routed to a LinkedIn page featuring [the interim CEO's]
name and photograph, but [plaintiffs] honors and awards,
recommendations, and connections."58
The defendant-employer moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs
CFAA claim, arguing that she could not establish "a legally cognizable loss
or damages [under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)] in the brief period in which her
LinkedIn Account was accessed and controlled by Edcomm." 59 The court
granted defendant's motion, holding that her "claims that she was denied
potential business opportunities as a result of Edcomm's unauthorized
access and control over her account . .. [were] simply not compensable
under the CFAA."60 The court also held that plaintiffs alleged loss of
goodwill and reputation due to her inability to respond to business contact
during the time she was unable to access her LinkedIn account did not
57 No. 11-4303, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
58 Id. Plaintiffs access to her Linkedin account was disabled "from late June 20[1]1 through July
12, 2011. After filing suit, plaintiff contacted LinkedIn and was able to reestablish access to her account
but "continued to be unable to receive messages on her account for a substantial period of time
thereafter."
59 Id.
60 Id.
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amount to a cognizable loss under the CFAA.61
The CFAA's requirement that a party establish actual loss in the form of
damage to a computer or economic loss is a bar to recovery for employees
alleging improper access to their private online accounts. In most if not all
cases, the damages that employees and applicants would suffer by being
required to divulge their private online information would be difficult to
quantify in terms of economic loss, and would not likely result in loss in
the form of damage to a computer. Consequently, it would not seem that
the CFAA provides sufficient protection for employees' and applicants'
online privacy rights, which may not be readily quantified in terms of
damage to computers or economic loss.62
The PEAPPA would address this shortcoming by employing the
damages framework of the SCA, which provides for recovery of actual or
statutory damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees and punitive
damages. 63 These provisions will ensure that employees and applicants
have adequate recourse against unwarranted invasions of their online
personal accounts and that employers are prohibited from using their
unequal bargaining power to coerce the disclosure of private online
information as a condition of an offer of employment, or continued
employment.
III. COMMON-LAW RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As noted by a recent decision addressing the scope of the common-law
tort of invasion of privacy, "[p]rivacy in social networking is an emerging,
but underdeveloped, area of case law." 64 In the formulation of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
61 Id. ("'[C]laims [for] lost revenue, loss of goodwill, and interference with . . . customers . . . are
not cognizable losses under the CFAA.'). The court further held that the plaintiff "provided absolutely
no evidence in support of [her] assertions ... [and] reference[d] only generalized loss of ability to speak
with some unnamed and unknown "clients" and loss of potential and speculative business
opportunities." Id
62 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 89 ("Often, privacy receives inadequate
protection in the form of damages to compensate individual emotional or reputational harm; the effects
of the loss of privacy on freedom, culture, creativity, innovation, and public life are not factored into the
valuation.").
63 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006), with PEAPPA § 6(c), infra p.32.
6 See Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv., Civ. No. 2:11-cv-03305 (WJM), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74558, at *12 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's intrusion upon seclusion claim
would survive motion to dismiss where she "may have had a reasonable expectation that her Facebook
posting would remain private, considering that she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page
from public viewing").
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his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." 65 The approach of the Restatement is predicated on the view that
"' [t]he right protected by the action for the invasion of privacy is a personal
right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded."' 66
Certain commentators have posited that the common-law approach is
based on a conceptually restrictive view of the value of privacy, which is
founded primarily on privacy's utility in terms of value to the individual,
and to the exclusion of the broader societal value that privacy affords to the
community as a whole. 67 This view, it is suggested, overlooks that
"[p]rivacy is valuable not only for our personal lives, but for our lives as
citizens-our participation in public and community life. ... [P]rivacy is
more than a psychological need or desire; it is a profound dimension of
social structure." 68 As a result of this constricted view of the value of
privacy, the common-law approach under the Restatement does not take
proper account of these salutary societal benefits of privacy, which benefits
also inure to the individual. 69
In recent cases applying the common-law tort of privacy in the social
media context, this restrictive view of privacy has provided inadequate
protection to the privacy rights of employees whose password-protected
social media account information has been accessed by their employers.
A. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Designs Group, Ltd.
In Maremont v. Susan Fredman Designs Group, Ltd.,70 the plaintiff, a
former marketing director for the defendant, brought suit in Illinois federal
court, alleging that her former employer accessed and used her personal
Twitter and Facebook accounts without her authorization to promote its
65 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B.
66 SOLOvE, supra note 62, at 89 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(I) cmt. a).
67 Id. ("The problem with framing privacy solely in individualistic terms is that privacy becomes
undervalued. Often, privacy receives inadequate protection in the form of damages to compensate
individual emotional or reputational harm; the effects of the loss of privacy on freedom, culture,
creativity, innovation, and public life are not factored into the valuation.").
68 Id. at 93. See also Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DjEDALUS,
THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES (Fall 2011) ("Time spent on social
networks, such as Facebook, is an amalgam of engagement with personal, social, intimate and home
life, political association, and professional or work life.").
69 SOLOVE supra note 62, at 92 ("[P]rivacy harms affect the nature of society and impede
individual activities that contribute to the greater social good."). See also id. at 91 ("When
individualism is severed from the common good, the weighing of values is often skewed toward those
equated with the common good, since the interests of society often outweigh the interests of particular
individuals. When individualism is not considered at odds with the common good, we can better assess
its values, contributions, and limitations.").
70 No. 10-C-7811,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140446, at *19-22 (N.D. 111. Dec. 7,2011).
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business while she was out of the office convalescing after a severe work-
related automobile accident. 71 When plaintiff learned of her employer's
unauthorized use of her personal password-protected social network
accounts, she asked that defendant and its employees cease using her
Facebook and Twitter accounts while she was in the hospital. Defendant's
employees continued to use her personal online accounts to promote
defendant's business. 72
Based on the defendant's unauthorized access to her personal Facebook
and Twitter accounts, Ms. Maremont asserted claims for (1) false
endorsement under the federal Lanham Act, (2) violation of the SCA, and
(3) violation of her common-law right to privacy. The court dismissed her
common-law right to privacy claim, holding that "the matters discussed in
[plaintiffs] Facebook and Twitter posts were not private and that [plaintiff]
did not try to keep any such facts private." Notably, the Maremont court
reached this conclusion despite finding that "Facebook posts are accessible
only to those whom the user selects, and thus they are not strictly public."73
What the Maremont court's ruling overlooks is that, by posting
information online to a select group of individuals on a social network, a
user has not effectively ceded any privacy right. To argue otherwise would
conflate privacy with secrecy. 74 For information to be treated as private, it
need not be completely secret.75 Rather, "'[t]he mere fact that a person can
be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally
be forced to be seen by everyone."' 76
71 Id at *6.
72 Id at *7.
73 Id. at n.2 (emphasis added).
74 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSsiP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 178 (Yale Univ. Press 2007) (observing that in social networking context, "[tjhere is no
magic number" and that "[i]nstead of counting how many other people know certain information, we
should focus on the social circles in which information travels."), available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Future-of-Reputation/text.htm; Carly Brandenburg, The
Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social Networker's Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597, 598
(2011) ("The fact that a Facebook user could permit hundreds, or even thousands, of people to view her
profile may not be the only indication of whether the social networker has a reasonable expectation of
privacy where unwelcome viewers are involved. It seems plausible that 'if you are using privacy
features that you believe restrict access to very few specific people completely within your control, and
an employer somehow hacks past such a privacy barrier, you may have a strong privacy claim.').
75 See M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 632 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2001) ("[T]he
claim of a right of privacy is not 'so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle
of intimacy-to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.' Information disclosed to a few
people may remain private."). See also Connie Davis Powell, Privacy for Social Networking, 34 U.
ARK. L. REv. 689, 702 (2012) (discussing cases which "suggest that even if an individual discloses
information about himself to dozens of people without legal or contractual constraints on those people's
ability to disseminate the information further, the information can remain 'private' for the purposes of
privacy tort law.").
76 Powell, supra note 75, at 702-03 (quoting Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 72
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The court's decision is also silent as to whether any consideration was
given to the viability of the common-law privacy claim based on the
defendant-employer's unauthorized access to the non-public portions of the
plaintiffs personal password-protected Facebook and Twitter accounts that
would have been required to issue public Facebook postings and Tweets
from her accounts. The fact that certain communications made from her
password-protected accounts were made to the public did not amount to
license for her employer to use her passwords without authorization to root
through her personal accounts for its own benefit.
Under the proposed PEAPPA, courts would be relieved of the need to
engage in such unnecessary inquiries as to whether a user reasonably
believed that its password-protected communications were private. Nor
would there be a need for a factual finding that such an intrusion is "highly
offensive."77 Rather, the PEAPPA effectively engrafts a blanket
presumption that it is highly offensive for an employer to access a current
or prospective employee's personal online account information, unless a
valid exception applies.78
B. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group
As noted above in Part II.A.1, in Pietrylo, the plaintiffs alleged that their
manager accessed a secure password-protected Myspace chat room, Spec-
Tator, which was used by plaintiffs and their co-workers as a forum for
employees to complain about the employer. The jury found that the
employer's conduct violated the SCA;79 the jury, however, found against
plaintiffs on their common-law invasion of privacy claim.80 It is
noteworthy that the court held that, as with their SCA claim, "the ability of
Plaintiffs to recover on [the common-law claim] for invasion of privacy
tum[ed] on the disputed issue of whether or not [the co-worker] gave
'consent' for Defendant to view the Spec-Tator."81
However, in a seemingly inconsistent finding, the jury found in the
affirmative on the question of whether the plaintiffs' password-protected
Myspace chat room was "a place of solitude and seclusion which was
designed to protect the Plaintiffs' private affairs," but held nonetheless that
plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Spectator
(Cal. 1999)).
77 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B.
78 See PEAPPA §§ 3 & 4, infra pp. 29-31.
79 See supra pp. 10-11.
80 Pietrylo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *19-20 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
81 Id
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chat room. 82 In effect, the jury determined that the company improperly
accessed the Myspace page without consent as to the SCA claim, but that it
was not reasonable for plaintiffs to expect that their consent would be
required to access their "place of solitude and seclusion which was
designed to protect [their] private affairs and concerns" 83 as to the
common-law privacy claim.
Other courts have also reached similarly discordant results in attempting
to apply the common-law of privacy to social networking sites. 84 In light of
holdings in these cases, it is evident that the fact-specific nature of inquiries
as to whether and when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for
password-protected online activity leaves employees and applicants with
limited protection at common law in instances in which their password-
protected online information has been improperly compromised.
C. The Mistaken Notion That Users Do Not Expect Privacy in Their
Online Interactions
There is the view professed in certain quarters that privacy is a dead
letter in the online agora, pointing to the alacrity with which users of social
networks share their personal information in such fora.85 For instance, in
January 2010, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, remarked that there has
been something of a paradigm shift as relates to users' online privacy
expectations: "[P]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing
more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more
people. That social norm is just something that has evolved over time." 86
While it may be that some people have become more comfortable with
sharing information online, what Mr. Zuckerberg's statement overlooks is
the extent to which social network users have a more particularized or
context-specific view as to the appropriate flow of their online
82 Jury Verdict Sheet, Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754, ECF No. 61.
83 Id.
84 See Ehling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74558, at *12 (observing that "Courts . . . have not yet
developed a coherent approach" and "differ dramatically" as to whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in password-protected online communications that are shared with others) (collecting
cases).
85 NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 221 (noting "the apparent abandon with which participants
confide their inner thoughts and post personal information and photographs of themselves and others to
their profiles," which "leads many people ... to assert that 'the youth of today' do not care about
privacy.").
86 Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook's Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is Over, READWRITE
(Jan. 9, 2010),
http://readwrite.com/2010/01/09/facebookszuckerbergsaystheage of privacyis ov.
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communications. 87 That is, employees and applicants expect that their
information is used within the online context as they intended it to be used
and for no other reasons. Studies suggest that users of social networks are
becoming increasingly concerned about the protection accorded to their
online personae and are more often availing themselves of the sites'
privacy settings.88 By so doing, users are effectively registering their intent
that their online content be treated as private. 89
To demonstrate the extent to which users of social media are concerned
with the privacy of their online communications one need only look to the
backlash that ensued as a result of unilateral changes by social network
providers to their terms of service as relates to the privacy of users' account
information. For instance, in December 2012, a user revolt erupted when
Instagram, an online photo-sharing site owned by Facebook, reported that it
intended to change its terms of service in a manner that was widely
interpreted as suggesting that Instagram intended to "begin selling its user
photos to advertisers without users' consent." 90 As a result of public
uproar, the company agreed to revert to its prior terms of service with
respect to advertising.91  The vehemence of the user response to
87 NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 127.
A right to privacy is neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control, but a right to appropriate flow
of information. Privacy may still be posited as an important human right or value worth protecting
through law and other means, but what this amounts to is a right to contextual integrity and what
this amounts to varies from context to context.
Id.; See also Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social
Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 124 (2012) (concluding
that, although millennials are comfortable sharing private information in online fora, they maintain an
expectation of "network privacy," or "audience segregation" and as such are uncomfortable with being
"forced to share with unintended audiences and objected to being judged across contexts.").
88 MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEWRESEARCHCENTER, REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND
SOCIAL MEDIA 29 (May 26, 2010), available at
http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIPReputation-Management with topline.pdf
(noting that "71% of social networking users ages 18-29 have changed the privacy settings on their
profile to limit what they share with others online" and "55% of SNS users ages 50-64 have changed
the default settings").
89 See Adam Pabarcus, Contemporary Issues in Cyberlaw: Are "Private" Spaces on Social
Networking Websites Truly Private? The Extension of Intrusion Upon Seclusion, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 397 (2011) (advocating change to common-law privacy tort such that "[w]hen social network
users create a private profile or group, it is as if they are closing the virtual door behind them. Everyone,
including people off of Facebook, can no longer see their profile or groups. Any unauthorized
monitoring or viewing of the private virtual space would constitute an intrusion.").
90 Hayley Tsukayama, Instagram Reminds Users of Privacy Policy Change, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-16/business/36384825_1_instagram-
function-photos-new-terms.
91 Kevin Systrom, Updated Terms of Service Based on Your Feedback, INSTAGRAM BLOG,
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38421250999/updated-terms-of-service-based-on-your-feedback.
Notably, the company has proceeded with plans to consolidate the user information on the servers of its
parent company, Facebook. Privacy and Terms of Service Changes on Instagram, INSTAGRAM BLOG,
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38143346554/privacy-and-terms-of-service-changes-on-instagram.
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Instagram's announced changes to its terms of service keenly demonstrates
the extent to which users intend that the private information they post and
share on such sites be shared no further than to those with whom they have
intentionally communicated that information.
One commentator argues that the 'bait and switch' tactics and opaque
and prolix terms of service used by social networking sites have resulted in
user confusion as to what information is accessible to the public, thus
exposing them to unnecessary risk of harm." 92 Although it has been
estimated that a small number of users actually read the terms of service of
the social network to which they belong-and even fewer actually
comprehend them,93 this does not mean that users' expectation that the
information that they set as private should remain so is unreasonable. In
the case of Facebook, the serial changes to its privacy policies have limited
users' ability to control the privacy of personal information on the social
network.94 Indeed, certain changes to Facebook's privacy settings have
invited regulatory action by the Federal Trade Commission.95
Moreover, notwithstanding the uncertain solace that social networks'
privacy settings and terms of service may offer, there are still valid reasons
that users choose to share personal information online. 96 In the employment
context, a 2010 survey suggests a significant disconnect as relates to U.S.
consumers' expectation as compared with the reality of how their online
92 Connie Davis Powell, Social Networking and the Law: You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get
Over It!, Would Warren and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REv. 146,
169 (2011) (observing the "troubling ... change of privacy policies, which often occur after users have
disclosed personal information"). See also SOLOVE supra note 62, at 73 (suggesting that "several
factors can affect people's decisions about privacy," including, "limited bargaining power respecting
privacy and inability to assess the privacy risks.").
93 See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2009) (citing a "2006
survey of Facebook users [which] found that seventy-seven percent had never read its privacy policy
and that large majorities had mistaken beliefs about how Facebook collected and shared personal
information").
94 Kurt Opsahl, Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr.
28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline/. See also Nick Bilton, Facebook
Changes Privacy Settings, Again, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:35 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/facebook-changes-privacy-settings-again/ (noting changes
that, while improving certain privacy settings, also "eliminat[ed] the ability for people to hide
themselves on Facebook's search, a control, that until now, has existed in the privacy settings on the
company's Web site").
95 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC Approves Final Settlement With Facebook, Facebook Must Obtain
Consumers' Consent Before Sharing Their Information Beyond Established Privacy Settings, available
at http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/facebook.shtm. Under the terms of the settlement with the FTC, Facebook
has agreed to "giv[e] consumers clear and prominent notice and obtaining their express consent before
sharing their information beyond their privacy settings, . . . "maintain[] a comprehensive privacy
program to protect consumers' information, and. "obtain[] biennial privacy audits from an
independent third party." Id.
96 Id at 73 (suggesting that "several factors can affect people's decisions about privacy," including,
"limited bargaining power respecting privacy and inability to assess the privacy risks.").
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information is used in hiring decisions. 97 According to the survey, 70% of
U.S. recruiters and HR professionals surveyed rejected job candidates
based on information found online, but "only 7% of U.S. consumers
surveyed believe information about them online affected theirjob search.98
There is, however, a growing awareness of the need to restrict online
information flow in connection with one's employment status within the
U.S. workforce, particularly among younger users of social networking
sites. A 2013 survey of social media users between the ages of 18 and 34
revealed that over a quarter of those surveyed were concerned that content
they posted could negatively impact their employment. Of those surveyed,
21% reported that they had removed content from their social media
accounts in order to avoid employer scrutiny and 82% said they "pay at
least some attention to their privacy settings." 99 In light of this increasing
recognition of the need of users to control the flow of information in their
personal electronic accounts, appropriate federal protection in the form of
the PEAPPA proposed herein is needed.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE - THE PERSONAL ELECTRONIC ACCOUNT
PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
A. Key Provisions
The model Personal Electronic Account Privacy Protection Act
["PEAPPA"] seeks to eliminate any ambiguity as to whether an
individual's personal online content is protected from access by a current or
prospective employer. Simply stated, once an employee or applicant has
set her social network or other electronic account so that access to online
content is protected from public view, the inquiry is at an end. By so
doing, the employee or applicant has established a reasonable expectation
that his online content should be treated as private.
By dispensing with the need for a fact-specific common-law inquiry as
to whether there is a personal privacy violation, the PEAPPA would send a
clear message in favor of the broader societal value in protecting
97 Supra note 8.
98 Id. at 5.
99 See Wang, supra note 10. See also MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEWRESEARCHCENTER,
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 29 (May 26, 2010),
http://pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIPReputation-Management with topline.pdf
(noting that "71% of social networking users ages 18-29 have changed the privacy settings on their
profile to limit what they share with others online" and "55% of SNS users ages 50-64 have changed
the default settings").
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individuals' private online communications. The protected content would
then not be accessible to the employer unless an appropriate exception
warrants such disclosure. In the case of enumerated job classes, such as
those involving national security, law enforcement, or certain regulated
industries, the burden would shift to the employer to demonstrate that its
need for the employee or applicant's private online information fell within
a particular enumerated exception.
The PEAPPA would also reduce ambiguity as to whether an employee or
applicant assented to the disclosure of his private online information.
Rather, because employers would be barred from requesting such access to
private online information, the PEAPPA would protect employees and
applicants from any subtle coercive measure that might be argued to
constitute authorized access. Further, unlike the CFAA, the PEAPPA
would not require that a party show economic loss or damage to a computer
as a result of the employer's violative access to private online information
to establish entitlement to relief.100 This would serve to ensure that the
individual and broader societal interest in privacy protection is afforded
appropriate value.
1. Definitionslot
The proposed model statute would prohibit employers from requesting or
requiring current or prospective employees to provide access to their
"personal electronic accounts," which are defined as:
an electronic service, account, or electronic content created via a
bounded system, that provides the employee or applicant for employment
with the ability to input or store access information via an electronic device
to view, create, utilize, or edit the employee or applicant's account
information, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs,
video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or
accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations, profile, display,
communications, or other stored data.102
The broad definition is intended to cover not only social network
accounts, but also email accounts, and other electronic communication
channels that may emerge in the future. In that way, the statutory text
would avoid the challenges of applying the outmoded language of the SCA
100 See supra Part II.B.
101 The model statute proposed herein builds largely on the provisional framework of Michigan's
Internet Privacy Protection Act, 2012 Mi. Adv. Legis. Serv. 487 (LexisNexis).
102 See PEAPPA § 2(c), infra p 30.
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to new and emerging communications platforms.1 03
2. Prohibited Conduct
a. Employers
Under the model PEAPPA, employers would be prohibited from
requiring or requesting that an employee or applicant provide access, allow
observation or disclose information to permit access to the employee's or
applicant's personal electronic accounts. This provision would prevent
both employers from requesting users' passwords, as well as the practice of
shoulder-surfing, in which the employer reads over the employee's or
applicant's shoulder while she logs in to her private online accounts. In
addition, the model statute would also prohibit conduct such as that at issue
in Pietrylo in which the company supervisor watched the screen while the
plaintiffs' co-worker accessed the Spec-Tator chat room. 104 Furthermore,
the PEAPPA includes a provision prohibiting employers from otherwise
accessing employee or applicant private social networking or other
electronic content, to eliminate any ambiguity as to co-worker consent to
obtain access a subject employee private online information.
The PEAPPA also contains broad anti-retaliation provisions, which
cover both instances in which employees and applicants refuse to provide
password-protected personal electronic account information, as well as
where they participate in proceedings under the Act.10 5 These provisions
ensure that employees and applicants can vindicate their rights under the
PEAPPA without fear of retribution. 106
b. "Personal Electronic Account Service Providers"
The PEAPPA would also create a private right of action against
providers of personal electronic accounts that fail to provide, with a
minimum of thirty days' advance written notice to users, and an
opportunity to opt out of the subject service prior to making changes to
103 See supra Part IIA.
104 See PEAPPA § 3(a)(1), infra p. 30 (prohibiting employers from requiring or requesting
employee or applicant to "allow observation of" their personal electronic account).
105 Id. § 2(a)(2).
106 The PEAPPA's anti-retaliation provision would permit for recovery for retaliation where the
current or prospective employee shows that the denial to provide access to a personal electronic account
was a "motivating factor," as opposed to the "but for" cause of the retaliatory action by an employer.
PEAPPA § 3(a)(3)(C). Cf Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) ("The
text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under §
2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse
action by the employer).
2016] 3 15
JOURNAL OFCIVLRIGIflS& ECONOMI4CDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:3
privacy settings, terms of service, or taking other actions that would have
the "effect of publicly disclosing personal electronic account
information." 0 7 This provision is intended to give additional force to the
employer prohibitions against requesting or requiring the disclosure of
personal electronic account information. It does so by ensuring that
employees and applicants have some level of comfort that their online
account privacy settings will not be changed precipitously by online service
providers to their detriment.
3. Exceptions
The PEAPPA incorporates a number of the exceptions intended to
permit employer inquiries into otherwise protected personal electronic
account information in connection with certain positions, such as those
involving working directly with minors, and those within the financial
services industry who are required by law or rule to monitor online
communications of certain registered individuals. 08 In such instances, the
Act puts the onus on the employer to ensure that such private information is
not improperly disseminated.
The PEAPPA gives additional protection to employers by explicitly
providing that it does not create a duty for employers to search personal
electronic accounts, which ensures that claims of negligent retention or
hiring would not result from employers' compliance with the Act's
prohibitions.109 These provisions are intended to strike an appropriate
balance to allow employers latitude to conduct legitimate, good-faith
investigations in the course of their business.
4. Remedies
The PEAPPA would provide a private right of action, equitable and
declaratory relief, as well as compensatory, statutory and punitive
damages.11 0 These remedial provisions are intended to ensure that the Act
provides a sufficient bulwark against improper transgressions by employers
or personal electronic account service providers in their handling of
employees' and applicants' private online information. It is submitted that
107 Id. § 2(b)(1).
108 See PEAPPA § 4(a)(4) & (5), infra pp. 30-32.
109 Id. § 5.
110 See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548. But see Van Alstyne v. Electronic
Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual
damages in order to recover statutory damages under the SCA, but may recover punitive damages,
attorney fees and costs without showing actual damages).
316
THE NEED FOR STRONGER PR WACYPROTECTION
without these measures, employees and applicants would be without
adequate means to protect their personal privacy interests as companies
would have less incentive to comply without the threat of civil litigation
and liability.
CONCLUSION
"Privacy ... has a social value-it shapes the communities in which we
live, and it provides necessary protection of individuals against various
types of harms and disruptions.... We establish privacy protections
because of their profound effects on the structure of power and freedom
within society as a whole. The protection of privacy shields us from
disruption to activities important to both individuals and society." 111
Efforts to protect employees' and applicants' online private information
under the existing framework of the SCA, CFAA and the common law
have resulted in inconsistent and inequitable outcomes for employees and
applicants. A model federal statute in the form of the PEAPPA would
serve to eliminate confusion and uncertainty created by varying standards
under the SCA, CFAA and the common law. By eliminating the
requirement under the SCA and CFAA that an employee or applicant show
that an employer's access to protected content was not authorized, the
model statute would provide greater clarity and protections to employees,
applicants and employers as to the private online information that is
presumed to be off limits. This would level the playing field given the
decidedly unequal bargaining power between most employees' and
applicants' and current and prospective employers.
By also providing employees and applicants with a private cause of
action against electronic account service providers where those companies
acts or omissions cause the unwarranted disclosure of private information,
the model statute would also serve to incent service providers to hew to the
spirit and letter of the privacy policies and terms of service and to take care
that changes in such policies are undertaken in a manner that protects the
private content of employees and applicants.
I sOLOVE supra note 62, at 92.
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PERSONAL ELECTRONIC ACCOUNT PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
Sec. 1. Title
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Personal Electronic
Account Privacy Protection Act."
Sec. 2. Definitions
As used in this Act:
(a) "Access information" means user name, password, login information,
or other security information that protects access to a personal electronic
account.
(b) "Employer" means a person, including a unit of federal, state or local
government, engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other
enterprise and includes an agent, representative, or designee of the
employer, acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee or an applicant for employment;
(c) "Personal electronic account" means an electronic service, account,
or electronic content created via a bounded system, that requires the
employee or applicant for employment to input or store access information
via an electronic device to view, create, utilize, or edit the employee or
applicant's account information, including, but not limited to, videos, still
photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email,
online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations,
profile, display, communications, or other stored data;
(d) "Personal electronic account service provider" means a person,
engaged in the business, industry, profession, trade, or enterprise of
providing personal electronic account services, and includes an agent,
representative, or designee of the personal electronic account service
provider, acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an personal
electronic account service provider.
Sec. 3. Prohibited Conduct
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer-
(1) to require or request that an employee or applicant for employment
provide access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that allows
access to or observation of an employee's or applicant's personal electronic
account; or
(2) to otherwise access or observe the content contained on an
employee's or applicant's personal electronic account that would require
access information to access or observe; or
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(3) to discharge, discipline, discriminate against in any manner, or deny
employment or promotion to, or threaten to take any such action against,
any employee or applicant for employment because-
(A) the employee or applicant for employment refuses or declines to
provide access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that allows
access to or observation of the employee's or applicant's personal
electronic account; or
(B) such employee or applicant for employment has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to
this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.
(C) A violation is established under subsection (a)(3)(A) or (a)(3)(A)
when the employee or applicant party demonstrates that their denial of
access to a personal electronic account was a motivating factor for any
practice prohibited under subsection (a)(3), even though other factors also
motivated the practice.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any personal electronic account service
provider-
(1) To fail to provide users of a personal electronic account a minimum
thirty days' advance written notice prior to making changes to privacy
policies, terms of service, or taking other actions which have the effect of
disclosing users' private account information that have the effect of
publicly disclosing personal electronic account information.
Sec. 4. Exceptions
(a) This Act does not prohibit an employer from doing any of the
following:
(1) Conducting an investigation or requiring an employee to cooperate in
an investigation in any of the following circumstances:
(A) If there is specific information about activity on the employee's or
applicant's personal electronic account, for the purpose of ensuring
compliance with applicable laws, regulatory requirements, or prohibitions
against work-related employee misconduct.
(B) If the employer has specific information about an unauthorized
transfer of the employer's proprietary information, confidential
information, or financial data to an employee's personal electronic account.
(2) Restricting or prohibiting an employee's access to certain websites
while using an electronic communications device paid for in whole or in
part by the employer or while using an employer's network or resources.
(3) Monitoring, reviewing, or accessing electronic data stored on an
electronic communications device paid for in whole or in part by the
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employer, or traveling through or stored on an employer's network.
(4) Complying with a duty to screen employees or applicants prior to
hiring or to monitor or retain employee communications that is established
under federal law or by a self-regulatory organization, as defined in §
3(a)(26) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(26).
(5) This Act does not prohibit or restrict an employer from requiring or
requesting that an employee or applicant for employment provide access to,
allow observation of, or disclose information that allows access to or
observation of an employee's or applicant's personal electronic account
with respect to the particular classes of employees set forth below in
subsections (A) through (C) and the employer's action relates to employees
in such class who work or seek to work
(A) in a position involving contact with individuals under 13 years of
age; or
(B) in a position involving law enforcement; or
(C) in a position involving national security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing exceptions, an employer shall be liable
under this Act in the event that it discloses an employee's or applicant's
personal electronic account information unless such disclosure is required
to comply with federal or state law.
(6) This Act does not prohibit or restrict an employer from viewing,
accessing, or utilizing information about an employee or applicant that can
be obtained without any required access information or that is available in
the public domain.
Sec. 5. No Creation of Employer Duties
This Act does not create a duty for an employer to search or monitor the
activity of a personal electronic account.
Sec. 6. Civil cause of action
(a) An individual who is the subject of a violation of this Act may bring
a civil action to recover from the person or entity engaged in that violation
such relief as may be appropriate.
(b) Relief. In a civil action under this section, appropriate relief
includes-
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c); and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
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incurred.
(c) Damages. The court may assess as damages in a civil action under
this section the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any
profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall
a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $ 1,000. If the
violation is willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages.
In the case of a successful action to enforce liability under this section, the
court may assess the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney
fees determined by the court.
Sec. 7. Election of Remedies
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or
remedies of any employee or applicant under any other Federal or State law
or regulation or under any collective bargaining agreement or employment
contract; except that the institution of an action in accordance with this act
shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under any
other Federal or State law, rule or regulation, or the common law.
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